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Abstract
The Gibbs entropy of a macroscopic classical system is a function of a probabil-
ity distribution over phase space, i.e., of an ensemble. In contrast, the Boltzmann
entropy is a function on phase space, and is thus defined for an individual system.
Our aim is to discuss and compare these two notions of entropy, along with the
associated ensemblist and individualist views of thermal equilibrium. Using the
Gibbsian ensembles for the computation of the Gibbs entropy, the two notions
yield the same (leading order) values for the entropy of a macroscopic system in
thermal equilibrium. The two approaches do not, however, necessarily agree for
non-equilibrium systems. For those, we argue that the Boltzmann entropy is the
one that corresponds to thermodynamic entropy, in particular in connection with
the second law of thermodynamics. Moreover, we describe the quantum analog of
the Boltzmann entropy, and we argue that the individualist (Boltzmannian) con-
cept of equilibrium is supported by the recent works on thermalization of closed
quantum systems.
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1 Introduction
Disagreement among scientists is often downplayed, and science often presented as an
accumulation of discoveries, of universally accepted contributions to our common body
of knowledge. But in fact, there is substantial disagreement among physicists, not only
concerning questions that we have too little information about to settle them, such as
the nature of dark matter, but also concerning conceptual questions about which all
facts have long been in the literature, such as the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Another question of the latter type concerns the definition of entropy and some related
concepts. In particular, two different formulations are often given in the literature for
how to define the thermodynamic entropy (in equilibrium and non-equilibrium states)
of a macroscopic physical system in terms of a microscopic, mechanical description
(classical or quantum).
1.1 Two Definitions of Entropy in Classical Statistical Mechan-
ics
In classical mechanics, the Gibbs entropy of a physical system with phase space X , for
example X = R6N = {(q1,v1, . . . , qN ,vN)} for N point particles in R3 with positions
qj and velocities vj, is defined as
SG(ρ) = −k
∫
X
dx ρ(x) log ρ(x) , (1)
where k is the Boltzmann constant, dx = N !−1d3q1 d
3v1 · · · d3qN d3vN the (symmetrized)
phase space volume measure, log the natural logarithm,1 and ρ a probability density on
X .2
The Boltzmann entropy of a macroscopic system is defined as
SB(X) = k log vol Γ(X) , (2)
1One actually takes the expression u log u to mean the continuous extension of the function u 7→
u log u from (0,∞) to the domain [0,∞); put differently, we follow the convention to set 0 log 0 = 0.
2Changing the unit of phase space volume will change ρ(x) by a constant factor and thus SG(ρ) by
addition of a constant, an issue that does not matter for the applications and disappears anyway in the
quantum case.
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where X ∈X is the actual phase point of the system, vol means the volume in X , and
Γ(X) is the set of all phase points that “look macroscopically the same” as X. Obviously,
there is no unique precise definition for “looking macroscopically the same,” so we have
a certain freedom to make a reasonable choice. It can be argued that for large numbers
N of particles (as appropriate for macroscopic physical systems), the arbitrariness in
the choice of Γ(X) shrinks and becomes less relevant.3 A convenient procedure is to
partition the phase space into regions Γν we call macro sets (see Figure 1),
X =
⋃
ν
Γν , (3)
and to take as Γ(X) the Γν containing X. That is,
SB(X) = SB(ν) := k log vol Γν . (4)
We will give more detail in Section 5. Boltzmann’s definition (2) is often abbreviated
as “SB = k logW” with W = vol Γ(X). In every energy shell there is usually one macro
set Γν = Γeq that corresponds to thermal equilibrium and takes up by far most (say,
more than 99.99%) of the volume (see Section 5.1).
1.2 X vs. ρ
An immediate problem with the Gibbs entropy is that while every classical system has
a definite phase point X (even if we observers do not know it), a system does not
“have a ρ”; that is, it is not clear which distribution ρ to use. For a system in thermal
equilibrium, ρ presumably means a Gibbsian equilibrium ensemble (micro-canonical,
canonical, or grand-canonical). It follows that, for thermal equilibrium states, SB and
SG agree to leading order, see (31) below. In general, several possibilities for ρ come to
mind:
(a) ignorance: ρ(x) expresses the strength of an observer’s belief that X = x.
(b) preparation procedure: A given procedure does not always reproduce the same
phase point, but produces a random phase point with distribution ρ.
(c) coarse graining: Associate with every X ∈X a distribution ρX(x) onX that cap-
tures how macro-similar X and x are (or perhaps, how strongly an ideal observer
seeing a system with phase point X would believe that X = x).
Correspondingly, there are several different notions of Gibbs entropy, which we will
discuss in Sections 4 and 6. Here, maybe (c) could be regarded as a special case of (a),
and thermal equilibrium ensembles as a special case of (b). In fact, it seems that Gibbs
himself had in mind that any system in thermal equilibrium has a random phase point
whose distribution ρ should be used, which is consistent with option (b); in his words
(Gibbs, 1902, p. 152):
3For example, for a dilute gas and large N , −SB(X)/k+N equals approximately the H functional,
i.e., the integral in (9) below, which does not refer any more to a specific choice of boundaries of Γ(X).
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Figure 1: Partition of phase space, or rather an energy shell therein, into macro sets Γν ,
with the thermal equilibrium set taking up most of the volume (not drawn to scale).
Reprinted from (Goldstein et al., 2017b).
[. . . ] we shall find that [the] distinction [between interaction of a sys-
tem S1 with a system S2 with determined phase point X2 and one with
distribution ρ2] corresponds to the distinction in thermodynamics between
mechanical and thermal action.
In our discussion we will also address the status of the Gibbsian ensembles (see also
Goldstein, 2019). We will argue that SB qualifies as a definition of thermodynamic
entropy whereas version (a) of SG does not; (b) is not correct in general; and (c) is
acceptable to the extent that it is not regarded as a special case of (a).
Different views about the meaning of entropy and the second law have consequences
about the explanatory and predictive power of the second law that we will consider
in Section 4. They also have practical consequences in the formulation of hydrody-
namic equations, e.g., Navier-Stokes equations, for macroscopic variables (Goldstein
and Lebowitz, 2004): such macroscopic equations can be compatible with a microscopic
Hamiltonian evolution only if they make sure that the Boltzmann entropy increases.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we raise the
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question of the status of the second law for SG and SB. In Section 3, we consider
the analogs of Gibbs and Boltzmann entropy in quantum mechanics. The following
Sections 4–8 focus again on the classical case for simplicity. In Section 4, we discuss and
criticize option (a), the idea that entropy is about subjective knowledge. In Section 5, we
explain why Boltzmann entropy indeed tends to increase with time and discuss doubts
and objections to this statement. In Section 6, we discuss an individualist understanding
of Gibbs entropy as a generalization of Boltzmann entropy. In Section 7, we discuss the
status of Gibbs’s ensembles. In Section 8, we comment on a few proposals for how
entropy increase should work for Gibbs entropy. In Section 9, we add some deeper
considerations about entropy in quantum mechanics. In Section 10, we conclude.
2 Status of the Second Law
2.1 Gibbs Entropy
Another immediate problem with the Gibbs entropy is that it does not change with
time,
dSG(ρt)
dt
= 0 , (5)
if ρ is taken to evolve in accord with the microscopic Hamiltonian dynamics, that is,
according to the Liouville equation
∂ρ
∂t
= −
6N∑
i=1
∂
∂xi
(
ρ(x) v(x)
)
, (6)
where v(x) is the vector field on X that appears in the equation of motion
dXi
dt
= vi(X(t)) (7)
for the phase point X(t) ∈ X , such as v = ω∇H with 6N × 6N matrix ω = ( 0 I−I 0 )
in position and momentum coordinates and H the Hamiltonian function. Generally,
the Gibbs entropy does not change when ρ gets transported by any volume-preserving
bijection Φ :X →X ,
SG(ρ ◦ Φ−1) = SG(ρ) . (8)
In particular, by Liouville’s theorem of the conservation of phase space volume, this
applies when Φ = Φt is the Hamiltonian time evolution, with X(t) = Φt(X(0)). The
time independence of SG(ρ) conflicts with the formulation of the second law given by
Clausius, the person who coined the “laws of thermodynamics” as follows (Clausius,
1865, p. 365):
1. The energy of the universe is constant.
2. The entropy of the universe tends to a maximum.
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Among the authors who took entropy to be the Gibbs entropy, some (e.g., Khinchin,
1941) have argued that Clausius’s wording of the second law is inappropriate or exag-
gerated, others (e.g., Mackey, 1989) that the Liouville evolution (6) is not the relevant
evolution here. We will come back to this point in Section 8. As we will explain in
Section 5, Clausius’s statement is actually correct for the Boltzmann entropy.
2.2 Boltzmann’s H and k logW
We should address right away a certain confusion about Gibbs and Boltzmann entropy
that has come from the fact that Boltzmann used, in connection with the Boltzmann
equation, the definition
S = −k
∫
X1
d3q d3v f˜(q,v) log f˜(q,v) (9)
for entropy. Boltzmann used the notation H (not to be confused with the Hamiltonian
function) for the integral in (9); this functional gave name to the H-theorem, which
asserts that H always decreases—except in thermal equilibrium, when H is constant in
time.
Here, X1 is the 1-particle phase space (for definiteness, R6), f˜ = Nf , and f is a
normalized distribution density in X1. The formula (9) obviously looks much like the
Gibbs entropy (and has presumably inspired Gibbs’s definition, which was published
after (9)). In fact, (9) is also the Gibbs entropy of ρ(x1, . . . , xN) := f(x1) · · · f(xN) (up
to addition of the constant kN logN). But here it is relevant that f means the empirical
distribution of N points in X1 (after smoothing, or in the limit N → ∞), and is thus
computed from X ∈X (see Section 5.4 below for more detail). So, the H functional or
the S in (9) is indeed a function on X , and in fact a special case of (2) (up to addition
of the constant kN) corresponding to a particular choice of dividing X into macro sets
Γν (see Section 5.1).
3 The Quantum Case
Consider a macroscopic quantum system (e.g., a gas of N > 1023 atoms in a box) with
Hilbert space H . We write S(H ) for the unit sphere in the Hilbert space H .
3.1 Entropy in Quantum Mechanics
The natural analog of the Gibbs entropy is the quantum Gibbs entropy or von Neumann
entropy of a given density matrix ρˆ on H (von Neumann, 1927),
SvN(ρˆ) = −k tr(ρˆ log ρˆ) . (10)
Von Neumann (1929) himself thought that this formula was not the most fundamental
one but only applicable in certain circumstances; we will discuss his proposal for the
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fundamental definition in Section 9 below. In a sense, the density matrix ρˆ plays the
role analogous to the classical distribution density ρ, and again, the question arises as
to what exactly ρˆ refers to: an observer’s ignorance or what? Our discussion of options
(a)–(c) above for the Gibbs entropy will apply equally to the von Neumann entropy. In
addition, there is also a further possibility:
(d) reduced density matrix: The system S1 is entangled with another system S2, and
ρˆ is obtained from the (perhaps even pure) state Ψ ∈ S(H1 ⊗H2) of S1 ∪ S2
through a partial trace, ρˆ = tr2 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|.
As we will discuss in Section 9.3, SvN with option (d) does not yield a good notion of
thermodynamic entropy, either.
In practice, systems are never isolated. But even if a macroscopic system were
perfectly isolated, heat would flow in it from the hotter to the cooler parts, and, as we
will explain in this section, there is a natural sense in which entropy can be defined
and increases. The idealization of an isolated system helps us focus on this sense. In
Section 3.2, we will point out why the results also cover non-isolated systems.
The closest quantum analog of the Boltzmann entropy is the following. A macro
state ν should correspond to, instead of a subset Γν of phase space, a subspace Hν
of Hilbert space H , called a macro space in the following; for different macro states
ν ′ 6= ν, the macro spaces should be mutually orthogonal, thus yielding a decomposition
of Hilbert space into an orthogonal sum (von Neumann, 1929; Goldstein et al., 2010a,b),
H =
⊕
ν
Hν , (11)
instead of the partition (3). Now the dimension of a subspace of H plays a role anal-
ogous to the volume of a subset of X , and correspondingly we define the quantum
Boltzmann entropy of a macro state ν by (Griffiths, 1994; Lebowitz, 2008; Goldstein et
al., 2010b)
SqB(ν) = k log dimHν . (12)
In fact, already Einstein (1914, Eq. (4a)) argued that the entropy of a macro state should
be proportional to the log of the “number of elementary quantum states” compatible
with that macro state; it seems that (12) fits very well with this description. To a system
with wave function ψ ∈Hν (or, for that matter, a density matrix concentrated in Hν)
we attribute the entropy value SqB(ψ) := SqB(ν).
It seems convincing that SqB(ν) yields the correct value of thermodynamic entropy.
For one thing, it is an extensive, or additive quantity: If we consider two systems S1,S2
with negligible interaction, then the Hilbert space of both together is the tensor product,
H = HS1∪S2 = HS1 ⊗HS2 , and it seems plausible that the macro states of S1 ∪S2
correspond to specifying the macro state of S1 and S2, resp., i.e., ν = (ν1, ν2) with
Hν =Hν1 ⊗Hν2 . As a consequence, the dimensions multiply, so
SqB(ν) = SqB(ν1) + SqB(ν2) . (13)
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For another thing, it is plausible that, analogously to the classical case, in every energy
shell (i.e., the subspaceH(E−∆E,E] corresponding to an energy interval (E−∆E,E] with
∆E the resolution of macroscopic energy measurements) there is a dominant macro space
Hν˜ whose dimension is near (say, greater than 99.99% of) the dimension of the energy
shell, and this macro state ν˜ corresponds to thermal equilibrium (e.g., Tasaki, 2016),
Hν˜ =Heq. As a consequence,
SqB(eq) ≈ k log dimH(E−∆E,E] , (14)
and the right-hand side is well known to yield appropriate values of thermodynamic
entropy in thermal equilibrium. In fact, the right-hand side agrees with SvN(ρˆmc), the
von Neumann entropy associated with the micro-canonical density matrix ρˆmc (i.e., the
normalized projection to H(E−∆E,E]) and with thermal equilibrium at energy E.
Of course, a general pure quantum state ψ ∈ S(H ) will be a non-trivial superposition
of contributions from different Hν ’s, ψ =
∑
ν Pˆνψ, where Pˆν is the projection to Hν .
One can say that ψ is a superposition of different entropy values, and in analogy to
other observables one can define the self-adjoint operator
Sˆ =
∑
ν
SqB(ν) Pˆν , (15)
whose eigenvalues are the SqB(ν) and eigenspaces the Hν .
Here, the question arises as to which entropy value we should attribute to a system
in state ψ. At this point, the foundations of statistical mechanics touch the foundations
of quantum mechanics, as the problem of Schro¨dinger’s cat (or the measurement prob-
lem of quantum mechanics) concerns precisely the status of wave functions ψ that are
superpositions of macroscopically different contributions, given that our intuition leads
us to expect a definite macroscopic situation. The standard “Copenhagen” formula-
tion of quantum mechanics does not have much useful to say here, but several proposed
“quantum theories without observers” have long solved the issue in clean and clear ways
(Goldstein, 1998):
• Bohmian mechanics (in our view the most convincing proposal) admits further
variables besides ψ by assuming that quantum particles have definite positions,
too. Since Schro¨dinger’s cat then has an actual configuration, there is a fact about
whether it is dead or alive, even though the wave function is still a superposition. In
the same way, the configuration usually selects one of the macroscopically different
contributions Pˆνψ; in fact, this happens when
the significantly nonzero Pˆνψ do not overlap much in configuration space. (16)
Artificial examples can be constructed for which this condition is violated, but it
seems that (16) is fulfilled in practice. In that case, it seems natural to regard
the entropy of that one contribution selected by the Bohmian configuration as the
actual entropy value.
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• Collapse theories modify the Schro¨dinger equation in a non-linear and stochastic
way so that, for macroscopic systems, the evolution of ψ avoids macroscopic su-
perpositions and drives ψ towards (a random) one of the Hν . Then the question
about the entropy of a macroscopic superposition does not arise.
• Maybe a many-worlds view (Everett, 1957; Wallace, 2012), in which each of the
contributions corresponds to a part of reality, can be viable (see Allori et al. (2011)
for critical discussion). Then the system’s entropy has different values in different
worlds.
We have thus defined the quantum Boltzmann entropy of a macroscopic system,
SqB(S ) , (17)
in each of these theories.
Some authors (e.g., von Neumann (1929); Safranek et al. (2017, 2018)) have proposed
averaging SqB(ν) with weights ‖Pˆνψ‖2, but that would yield an average entropy, not the
entropy (see also Section 4.1 and our discussion of (66) in Section 9.2).
Let us turn to the question of what the second law asserts in quantum mechanics.
Since SvN remains constant under the unitary time evolution inH , the discussion given
in Section 8 for SG applies equally to SvN. About SqB, we expect the following.
Conjecture 1. In Bohmian mechanics and collapse theories, for macroscopic systems
S with reasonable Hamiltonian Hˆ and decomposition H = ⊕νHν, every ν∗ and most
ψ ∈ S(Hν∗) are such that with probability close to 1, SqB(S ) is non-decreasing with
time, except for infrequent, shallow, and short-lived valleys, until it reaches the thermal
equilibrium value. Moreover, after reaching that value, SqB(S ) stays at that value for a
very long time.
Careful studies of this conjecture would be of interest but are presently missing. We
provide a bit more discussion in Section 9.
3.2 Open Systems
For open (non-isolated) systems, the quantum Boltzmann entropy can still be considered
and should still tend to increase—not for the reasons that make the von Neumann
entropy of the reduced density matrix increase (evolution from pure to mixed states),
but for the reasons that make the quantum Boltzmann entropy of an isolated system in
a pure state increase (evolution from small to large macro spaces). Let us elaborate.
In fact, the first question about an open system S1 (interacting with its environment
S2) would be how to define its state. A common answer is the reduced density matrix
ρˆ1 := tr2 |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (18)
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(if S1 ∪S2 is in the pure state Ψ); another possible answer is the conditional density
matrix (Du¨rr et al., 2005)
ρˆcond := trs2〈x2|Ψ〉〈Ψ|x2〉
∣∣∣
x2=X2
, (19)
where trs2 denotes the partial trace over the non-positional degrees of freedom of S2
(such as spin), the scalar products are partial scalar products involving only the position
degrees of freedom of S2, and X2 is the Bohmian configuration of S2. (To illustrate
the difference between ρˆ1 and ρˆcond, if S1 is Schro¨dinger’s cat and S2 its environment,
then ρˆ1 is a mixture of a live and a dead state, whereas ρˆcond is either a live or a dead
state, each with the appropriate probabilities.)
Second, it seems that the following analog of (16) is usually fulfilled in practice for
both the reduced density matrix ρˆ = ρˆ1 and the conditional density matrix ρˆ = ρˆcond:
For those ν for which Pˆν ρˆPˆν is significantly nonzero, the functions gν on
configuration space given by gν(x) := 〈x|Pˆν ρˆPˆν |x〉 do not overlap much. (20)
As with (16), if (20) holds, then the Bohmian configuration X1 of S1 selects the actual
macro state ν(X1) of S1. Moreover, ν(X1) should usually be the same for ρˆ = ρˆ1 as for
ρˆ = ρˆcond. Then this macro state determines the entropy,
SB(S1) := SB(ν(X1)) . (21)
In short, the concept of quantum Boltzmann entropy carries over from isolated systems
in pure states to open systems.
3.3 Quantum Thermalization
In the 21st century, there has been a wave of works on the thermalization of closed quan-
tum systems, often connected with the key words “eigenstate thermalization hypothesis”
(ETH) and “canonical typicality”; see, e.g., (Gemmer et al., 2004; Goldstein et al., 2006;
Popescu et al., 2006; Goldstein et al., 2010a; Gogolin and Eisert, 2016; Goldstein et al.,
2015; Kaufman et al., 2016) and the references therein. The common theme of these
works is that an individual, closed, macroscopic quantum system in a pure state ψt that
evolves unitarily will, under conditions usually satisfied and after a sufficient waiting
time, behave very much as one would expect a system in thermal equilibrium to behave;
more precisely, on such a system S with ψ0 in an energy shell, relevant observables
yield their thermal equilibrium values up to small deviations with probabilities close
to 1. For example, this happens simultaneously for all observables referring to a small
subsystem S1 of S that interacts weakly with the remainder S2 := S \S1, with the
further consequence (“canonical typicality”) that the reduced density matrix of S1,
ρˆ1 := tr2 |ψt〉〈ψt| , (22)
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is close to a canonical one (Goldstein et al., 2006),
ρˆ1 ≈ 1
Z
e−βHˆ1 , (23)
for suitable β and normalizing constant Z; here, Hˆ1 is the Hamiltonian of S1. For
another example, every initial wave function ofS in an energy shell will, after a sufficient
waiting time and for most of the time in the long run, be close to the thermal equilibrium
macro space Heq (Goldstein et al., 2010a), provided that the Hamiltonian Hˆ is non-
degenerate and (ETH) all eigenvectors of Hˆ are very close to Heq.
These works support the idea that the approach to thermal equilibrium need not
have anything to do with an observer’s ignorance. In fact, the system S always re-
mains in a pure state, and thus has von Neumann entropy SvN = 0 at all times. This
fact illustrates that the kind of thermalization relevant here involve neither an increase
in von Neumann entropy nor a stationary density matrix of S . Rather, ψt reaches,
after a sufficient waiting time, the ε-neighborhood of the macro space Hν˜ = Heq cor-
responding to thermal equilibrium in the energy shell (Goldstein et al., 2010a). That
is the “individualist” or “Boltzmannian” version of approach to thermal equilibrium in
quantum mechanics.
In fact, there are two individualist notions of thermal equilibrium in quantum me-
chanics, which have been called “macroscopic” and “microscopic thermal equilibrium”
(Goldstein et al., 2017b). Boltzmann’s approach requires only that macro observables
assume their equilibrium values (Goldstein et al., 2010a), whereas a stronger statement
is actually true after a long waiting time: that all micro observables assume their equi-
librium values (Goldstein et al., 2015). This is true not only for macroscopic systems,
but also for small systems (Goldstein et al., 2017a), and has in fact been verified exper-
imentally for a system with as few as 6 degrees of freedom (Kaufman et al., 2016).
We have emphasized earlier in this subsection that thermalization does not require
mixed quantum states. We should add that this does not mean that pure quantum states
are fully analogous to phase points in classical mechanics. In Bohmian mechanics, for
example, the analog of a phase point would be the pair (ψ,Q) comprising the system’s
wave function ψ and its configuration Q.
4 Subjective Entropy Is Not Enough
By “subjective entropy” we mean Gibbs entropy under option (a): the view that the
Gibbs entropy is the thermodynamic entropy, and that the distribution ρ in the Gibbs
entropy represents an observer’s subjective perspective and limited knowledge (e.g.,
Jaynes, 1965; Krylov, 1979; Mackey, 1989; Garibyan and Tegmark, 2014). We would
like to point to three major problems with this view.
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4.1 Cases of Wrong Values
The first problem is that in some situations, the subjective entropy does not appropri-
ately reproduce the thermodynamic entropy. For example, suppose an isolated room
contains a battery-powered heater, and we do not know whether it is on or off. If it is
on, then after ten minutes the air will be hot, the battery empty, and the entropy of the
room has a high value S3. Not so if the heater is off; then the entropy has the low initial
value S1 < S3. In view of our ignorance, we may attribute a subjective probability of 50
percent to each of “on” and “off.” After ten minutes, our subjective distribution ρ over
phase space will be spread over two regions with macroscopically different phase points,
and its Gibbs entropy SG(ρ) will have a value S2 between S1 and S3 (in fact, slightly
above the average of S1 and S3).
4 But the correct thermodynamic value is not S2, it
is either S1 (if the heater was off) or S3 (if the heater was on). So subjective entropy
yields the wrong value.
The same problem arises with option (b), which concerns a system prepared by some
procedure that, when repeated over and over, will lead to a distribution ρ of the system’s
phase point X. Suppose that the isolated room also contains a mechanism that tosses
a coin or generates a random bit Y ∈ {0, 1} in some other mechanical way; after that,
the mechanism turns on the heater or does not, depending on Y . We would normally
say that the entropy S after ten minutes is random, that S = S1 with probability 1/2
and S = S3 with probability 1/2. But the distribution ρ created by the procedure (and
the canonical distribution for each given value of Y ) is the same as in the previous
paragraph, and has Gibbs entropy SG(ρ) = S2, the wrong value.
4.2 Explanatory and Predictive Power
The second major problem with subjective entropy concerns the inadequacy of its ex-
planatory and predictive power. Consider for example the phenomenon that by thermal
contact, heat always flows from the hotter to the cooler body, not the other way around.
The usual explanation of this phenomenon is that entropy decreases when heat flows
to the hotter body, and the second law excludes that. Now that explanation would not
get off the ground if entropy meant subjective entropy: In the absence of observers,
does heat flow from the cooler to the hotter? In distant stars, does heat flow from the
cooler to the hotter? In the days before humans existed, did heat flow from the cooler
to the hotter? After the human race becomes extinct, will heat flow from the cooler
to the hotter? If not, why would observers be relevant at all to the explanation of the
phenomenon?
And as with explanation, so with prediction: Can we predict that heat will flow from
the hotter to the cooler also in the absence of observers? If so, why would observers be
4Generally, if several distribution functions ρi have mutually disjoint supports, and we choose one
of them randomly with probability pi, then the resulting distribution ρ =
∑
i piρi has Gibbs entropy
SG(
∑
i piρi) = −k
∫
dx(
∑
i pi ρi(x)) log(
∑
i pi ρi(x)) = −k
∑
i
∫
dx pi ρi log(pi ρi(x)) =
∑
i pi SG(ρi) −
k
∑
i pi log pi >
∑
i piSG(ρi). In our example, S2 = (S1 + S3)/2 + k log 2.
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relevant to the prediction?
So, subjective entropy does not seem relevant to either explaining or predicting heat
flow. That leaves us with the question, what is subjective entropy good for? The study
of subjective entropy is a subfield of psychology, not of physics. It is all about beliefs.
Some ensemblists may be inclined to say that the explanation of heat flow is that it
occurs the same way as if an observer observed it. But the fact remains that observers
actually have nothing to do with it.
Once the problem of explanatory power is appreciated, it seems obvious that subjec-
tive entropy is inappropriate: How could an objective physical phenomenon such as heat
flow from the hotter to the cooler depend on subjective belief? In fact, since different
observers may have different, incompatible subjective beliefs, how could coherent con-
sequences such as physical laws be drawn from them? And what if the subjects made
mistakes, what if they computed the time-evolved distribution ρ◦Φt incorrectly, what if
their beliefs were irrational—would that end the validity of subjective entropy? Some-
body may be inclined to say that subjective entropy is valid only if it is rational (e.g.,
Bricmont, 2019), but that means basically to back off from the thought that entropy
is subjective. It means that it does not play much of a role whether anybody’s actual
beliefs follow that particular ρ, but rather that there is a correct ρ that should be used;
we will come back to this view at the end of the next subsection.
Another drawback of the subjective entropy, not unrelated to the problem of explana-
tory power, is that it draws the attention away from the fact that the universe must have
very special initial conditions in order to yield a history with a thermodynamic arrow
of time. While the Boltzmann entropy draws attention to the special properties of the
initial state of the universe, the subjective entropy hides any such objective properties
under talk about knowledge.
4.3 Phase Points Play No Role
The third problem with subjective entropy is that SG(ρ) has nothing to do with the
properties of the phase points x at which ρ is significantly non-zero. SG(ρ) measures
essentially the width of the distribution ρ, much like the standard deviation of a prob-
ability distribution, except that the standard deviation yields the radius of the set over
which ρ is effectively distributed, whereas the Gibbs entropy yields the log of its volume
(see (26) below). The problem is reflected in the fact, mentioned around (8), that any
volume-preserving transformation Φ :X →X will leave the Gibbs entropy unchanged.
It does not matter to the Gibbs entropy how the x’s on which ρ is concentrated behave
physically, although this behavior is crucial to thermodynamic entropy and the second
law.
Some ensemblists may be inclined to say that the kind of ρ that occurs in practice
is not any old density function, but is approximately concentrated on phase points that
look macroscopically similar. This idea is essentially option (c) of Section 1.2, which
was to take ρ as a kind of coarse graining of the actual phase point X. Specifically, if
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Γ(X) denotes again the set of phase points that look macroscopically similar to X, then
we may want to take ρ = ρX to be the flat distribution over Γ(X),
ρX(x) =
1
vol Γ(X)
1Γ(X)(x) =
{
(vol Γ(X))−1 if x ∈ Γ(X)
0 if x /∈ Γ(X). (24)
With this choice we obtain exact agreement between the Gibbs and Boltzmann entropies,
SG(ρX) = SB(X) . (25)
Indeed, whenever ρ is the flat distribution over any subset A of phase space X , ρ(x) =
(volA)−1 1A(x), then
SG(ρ) = −k
∫
A
dx
(−1)
volA
log volA = k log volA . (26)
(This fact also illustrates the mathematical meaning of the Gibbs entropy of any distri-
bution ρ as the log of the volume over which ρ is effectively distributed.)
Of course, if we associate an entropy value SG(ρX) with every X ∈ X in this way,
then the use of Gibbs’s definition (1) seems like an unnecessary detour. In fact, we have
associated with every X ∈ X an entropy value S(X), and talk about the knowledge
of observers is not crucial to the definition of the function S, as is obvious from the
fact that the function S is nothing but the Boltzmann entropy, which was introduced
without mentioning observers.
This brings us once more to the idea that the ρ in SG(ρ) is the subjective belief
of a rational observer as advocated by Bricmont (2019). One could always use the
Boltzmann entropy and add a narrative about observers and their beliefs, such as:
Whenever X ∈ Γν , a rational observer should use the flat distribution over Γν , and the
Gibbs entropy of that observer’s belief is what entropy really means. One could say
such words. But they are also irrelevant, as observers’ knowledge is irrelevant to which
way heat flows, and the resulting entropy value agrees with SB(X) anyway.
4.4 What is Attractive About Subjective Entropy
Let us turn to factors that may seem attractive about the subjective entropy view:
First, it seems like the obvious interpretation of the density ρ that comes up in all
ensembles. But the Boltzmannian individualist view offers an alternative interpretation,
as we explain in Section 5.
Second, it is simple and elegant. That may be true but does not do away with the
problems mentioned.
Third, the subjective view mixes well with certain interpretations of quantum me-
chanics such as Copenhagen and quantum Bayesianism, which claim that quantum
mechanics is all about information or that one should not talk about reality. These in-
terpretations are problematical as well, mainly because all information must ultimately
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be information about things that exist, and it does not help to leave vague and unspec-
ified which things actually exist (Goldstein, 1998).
Fourth, the subjective view may seem to mix well with the work of Shannon (1948),
as the Shannon entropy is a discrete version of Gibbs entropy and often regarded as
quantifying the information content of a probability distribution. But actually, there is
not a strong link, as Shannon regarded the probabilities in his study of optimal coding
of data for transmission across a noisy channel as objective and did not claim any
connection with thermodynamics. (By the way, it is dangerous to loosely speak of the
“amount of information” in the same way as one speaks of, e.g., the amount of sand;
after all, the sand grains are equal to each other, and one does not care about whether
one gets this or that grain, whereas different pieces of information are not equivalent to
each other.)
Fifth and finally, a strong pull towards subjective entropy comes from the belief that
“objective entropy” either does not work or is ugly—a wrong belief, as we will explain
in Section 5.
4.5 Remarks
Further critiques of subjective entropy can be found in (Callender, 1999; Lebowitz and
Maes, 2003; Goldstein et al., 2017a; Goldstein, 2019).
We would like to comment on another quote. Jaynes (1965), a defender of subjective
entropy, reported a dictum of Wigner’s:
Entropy is an anthropomorphic concept.
Of course, this phrase can be interpreted in very different ways. Jaynes took it to
express that entropy refers to the knowledge of human observers—the subjective view
that we have criticized. But we do admit that there is a trait in entropy that depends
partly on human nature, and that is linked to a certain (though limited and usually
unproblematical) degree of arbitrariness in the definition of “looking macroscopically
the same.” This point will come up again in the next section.
5 Boltzmann’s Vision Works
Many authors expressed disbelief that Boltzmann’s understanding of entropy and the
second law could possibly work. Von Neumann (1929, Sec. 0.6) wrote:
As in classical mechanics, also here [in the quantum case] there is no way
that entropy could always increase, or even have a predominantly positive
sign of its [time] derivative (or difference quotient): the time reversal objec-
tion as well as the recurrence objection are valid in quantum mechanics as
well as in classical mechanics.
Khinchin (1941, §33, p. 139):
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[One often] states that because of thermal interaction of material bodies
the entropy of the universe is constantly increasing. It is also stated that
the entropy of a system “which is left to itself” must always increase; tak-
ing into account the probabilistic foundation of thermodynamics, one often
ascribes to this statement a statistical rather than absolute character. This
formulation is wrong if only becuase the entropy of an isolated system is a
thermodynamic function—not a phase-function—which means that it cannot
be considered as a random quantity; if E and all [external parameters] λs re-
main constant the entropy cannot change its value whereas by changing these
parameteres in an appropriate way we can make the entropy increase or de-
crease at will. Some authors (footnote: Comp. Borel, Me´canique statistique
classique, Paris 1925.) try to generalize the notion of entropy by considering
it as being a phase function which, depending on the phase, can assume
different values for the same set of thermodynamical parameters, and try to
prove that entropy so defined must increase, with overwhelming probability.
However, such a proof has not yet been given, and it is not at all clear how
such an artificial generalization of the notion of entropy could be useful to
the science of thermodynamics.
Jaynes (1965):
[T]he Boltzmann H theorem does not constitute a demonstration of the
second law for dilute gases[.]
Even Boltzmann himself was at times unassured. In a letter to Felix Klein in 1889, he
wrote:
Just when I received your dear letter I had another neurasthenic attack,
as I often do in Vienna, although I was spared them altogether in Munich.
With it came the fear that the whole H-curve was nonsense.
But actually, the H-curve (i.e., the time evolution of entropy) makes complete sense,
Boltzmann’s vision does work, and von Neumann, Khinchin, and Jaynes were all mis-
taken, so it is perhaps worth elucidating this point. Many other, deeper discussions can
be found in the literature, e.g., qualitative, popular accounts in (Penrose, 1989; Lebowitz
and Maes, 2003; Carroll, 2010), overviews in (Goldstein, 2001; Lebowitz, 2008; Gold-
stein, 2019), more technical and detailed discussions in (Boltzmann, 1898; Ehrenfest
and Ehrenfest, 1911; Lanford, 1976; Garrido et al., 2004; Falcioni et al., 2007; Cerino
et al., 2016; Goldstein et al., 2017a; Lazarovici, 2018). So we now give a summary of
Boltzmann’s explanation of the second law.
5.1 Macro States
We start with a partition X = ∪νΓν of phase space into macro sets as in Figure 1.
A natural way of obtaining such a partition would be to consider several functions
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Mj : X → R (j = 1, . . . , K) that we would regard as “macro variables.” Since macro
measurements have limited resolution (say, ∆Mj > 0), we want to think of the Mj as
suitably coarse-grained with a discrete set of values, say, {n∆Mj : n ∈ Z}. Then two
phase points x1, x2 ∈ X will look macroscopically the same if and only if Mj(x1) =
Mj(x2) for all j = 1, . . . , K, corresponding to
Γν =
{
x ∈X : Mj(x) = νj ∀j
}
, (27)
one for every macro state ν = (ν1, . . . , νK) described by the list of values of all Mj. We
will discuss a concrete example due to Boltzmann in Section 5.4. Since coarse-grained
energy should be one of the macro variables, say
M1(x) = [H(x)/∆E]∆E (28)
with H the Hamiltonian function and [x] the nearest integer to x ∈ R, every Γν is
contained in one micro-canonical energy shell
Xmc :=X(E−∆E,E] :=
{
x ∈X : E −∆E < H(x) ≤ E
}
. (29)
Of course, this description still leaves quite some freedom of choice and thus arbitrariness
in the partition, as different physicists may make different choices of macro variables
and of the way and scale to coarse-grain them; this realization makes an “anthropomor-
phic” element in SB explicit. Wallace (2019) complained that this element makes the
Boltzmann entropy “subjective” as well, but that complaint does not seem valid: rather,
SB and its increase provide an objective answer to a question that is of interest from
the human perspective. Moreover, as mentioned already, this anthorpomorphic element
becomes less relevant for larger N . It is usually not problematical and not subject to
the same problems as the subjective entropy.
Usually in macroscopic systems, there is, for every energy shell Xmc (or, if there are
further macroscopic conserved quantities besides energy, in the set where their values
have been fixed as well), one macro set Γν˜ that contains most (say, more than 99.99%)
of the phase space volume ofXmc (see, e.g., Boltzmann, 1898; Lanford, 1973; Lazarovici,
2018);5 in fact (Goldstein et al., 2017b, Eq. (6)),
vol Γν˜
volXmc
≈ 1− 10−cN (30)
with positive constant c. The existence of this dominant macro state means that all
macro observables are nearly-constant functions onXmc, in the sense that the set where
5There are exceptions, in which none of the macro sets dominates; for example, in the ferromagnetic
Ising model with vanishing external magnetic field and not-too-high temperature, there are two macro
states (the first having a majority of spins up, the second having a majority of spins down) that together
dominate but have equal volume; see also (Lazarovici, 2018). But that does not change much about
the discussion.
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they deviate (beyond tolerances) from their dominant values has tiny volume. This
macro state ν˜ is the thermal equilibrium state, Γν˜ = Γeq, see Figure 1, and the dominant
values of the macro observables are their thermal equilibrium values. That fits with
thermal equilibrium having maximal entropy, and it has the consequence that
SB(eq) ≈ k log volXmc = SG(ρmc) , (31)
where ρmc(x) = (volXmc)−1 1Xmc(x) is the micro-canonical distribution, and the (rela-
tive or absolute) error in the approximation tends to zero as N →∞.
Moreover, different macro sets Γν have vastly different volumes. In fact, usually the
small macro sets of an energy shell taken together are still much smaller than the next
bigger one,
vol(Γ
(E−∆E,E]
<ν ) vol(Γν) (32)
with
Γ
(E−∆E,E]
<ν :=
⋃
ν′:SB(ν′)<SB(ν)
Γν′ ∩X(E−∆E,E] . (33)
(There are exceptions to this rule of thumb; in particular, symmetries sometimes imply
that two or a few macro sets must have approximately the same volume.)
5.2 Entropy Increase
Now increase of Boltzmann entropy means that the phase point X(t) moves to bigger
and bigger macro sets Γν . In this framework, the second law can be stated as follows.
Mathematical second law. Given ν 6= eq, for most phase points X(0) in
Γν , X(t) moves to bigger and bigger macro sets as t increases until it reaches
Γeq, except possibly for entropy valleys that are infrequent, shallow, and
short-lived; once X(t) reaches Γeq, it stays in there for an extraordinarily
long time, except possibly for infrequent, shallow, and short-lived entropy
valleys.
(34)
The described behavior is depicted in Figure 2. Entropy valleys (i.e., periods of entropy
decrease and return to the previous level) are also called fluctuations. The physical
second law then asserts that the actual phase point of a real-world closed system behaves
the way described in (34) for most phase points.
As an illustration of (34) and as a step towards making it plausible, let us consider
two times, 0 and t > 0. Let At := Φt(Γν). By Liouville’s theorem, vol(At) = vol(Γν),
and thus, by (32),
vol(At ∩ Γ(E−∆E,E]<ν )
vol(At)
 1 . (35)
That is, only a small minority of points in At will have entropy smaller than SB(ν).
That is, for most points X(0) ∈ Γν ,
SB(X(0)) ≤ SB(X(t)) . (36)
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tS(0)
S(eq)
Figure 2: A typical entropy curve S(X(t)) according to Boltzmann: It should go up
except for infrequent, shallow, short-lived valleys; frequency, depth, and duration of the
valleys are exaggerated for better visibility. After very long times, the entropy should
go down considerably.
Another simple special case is the one in which the macro evolution is deterministic
(Garrido et al., 2004; Goldstein and Lebowitz, 2004; De Roeck et al., 2006). For the
sake of concreteness, assume that in a time step of a certain size τ , Γν1 gets mapped
into Γν2 , which in turn gets mapped into Γν3 , and so on up to νm:
Φτ (Γνi) ⊆ Γνi+1 . (37)
Then, by Liouville’s theorem, vol Γνi ≤ vol Γνi+1 , so
SB(νi) ≤ SB(νi+1) (38)
for all i = 1, . . . ,m − 1, so entropy does not decrease. Of course, in realistic cases, the
macro evolution becomes deterministic only in the limit N → ∞, and as long as N is
finite, there are a minority of points in Γνi that do not evolve to Γνi+1 .
Generally, if the Hamiltonian motion is not specially desgined for the given partition
of X , then it is quite intuitive that the motion of the phase point should tend to
lead to larger macro sets, and not to smaller ones. Numerical simulations exhibiting
this behavior are presented in (Falcioni et al., 2007). It is also quite intuitive that the
phase point would stay in Γeq for a very, very long time: If the non-equilibrium set
Γnoneq := Γ
(E−∆E,E]
<eq =Xmc \Γeq has only the fraction 10−cN of the volume of the energy
shell, cf. (30), then only a tiny fraction of Γeq should be able to evolve into the non-
equilibrium set Γnoneq in a short time; and if most points in Γnoneq spend a substantial
amount of time there, then it will take very, very long until a substantial fraction of
Γeq has visited Γnoneq. The statement that points in Γeq stay there for a long time fits
well with the observed stationarity of thermal equilibrium—which is why it is called
“equilibrium.”
Let us briefly address two classic objections to the idea that entropy increases:
• Time reversal (Loschmidt’s objection) shows that entropy increase cannot hold
for all phase points in Γν . Concretely, for relevant Hamiltonians the time reversal
mapping R :X →X , defined by
R(q1, . . . , qN ,v1, . . . ,vN) := (q1, . . . , qN ,−v1, . . . ,−vN) (39)
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with qi the position and vi the velocity of particle i, has the property
R ◦ Φt ◦R = Φ−t . (40)
Usually, Rmaps Γν onto some Γν′ (where ν
′ may or may not equal ν), so SB(R(x)) =
SB(x). So if some X(0) ∈ Γν1 evolves to X(t) ∈ Γν′ with SB(ν ′) > SB(ν1), then
R(X(t)) ∈ Γν evolves to R(X(0)), and its entropy decreases.
• Recurrence (Zermelo’s objection) shows that SB(X(t)) cannot forever be non-
decreasing; thus, X(t) cannot stay forever in Γeq once it reaches Γeq. (The Poincare´
recurrence theorem states that under conditions usually satisfied in Xmc, every
trajectory X(t), except for a set of measure zero of X(0)s, returns arbitrarily close
to X(0) at some arbitrarily late time.)
Contrary to von Neumann’s statement quoted in the beginning of Section 5, the second
law as formulated in (34) is not refuted by either objection: after all, the second law
applies to most, not all, phase points X(0), and it does not claim that X(t) will stay in
thermal equilibrium forever, but only for a very, very long time.
5.3 Non-Equilibrium
The term “non-equilibrium” is sometimes understood (Gallavotti, 2003) as referring to
so called non-equilibrium steady states (NESS), which concerns, for example, a system
S coupled to two infinite reservoirs of different temperature; so S is an open system
heated on one side and cooled on another, and it will tend to assume a macroscopically
stationary (“steady”) state with a temperature gradient, a nonzero heat current, and
a positive rate of entropy production (Onsager, 1931; Bergmann and Lebowitz, 1955;
Derrida, 2007; Goldstein et al., 2017a). In contrast, in this Section 5 we are considering
a closed system (i.e., not interacting with the outside), and “non-equilibrium” refers
to any phase point in Xmc \ Γeq. Examples of non-equilibrium macro states include,
but are not limited to, states in local thermal equilibrium but not in (global) thermal
equilibrium (such as systems hotter in one place than in another). Other examples
arise from removing a constraint or wall; such macro states may have been in thermal
equilibrium before the constraint was removed but are not longer so afterwards; for
example, think of a macro state in which all particles are in the left half of a box; for
another example, suppose we could turn on or off the interaction between two kinds of
particles (say, “red ones” and “blue ones”), and think of a macro state that is a thermal
equilibrium state when the interaction is off (so that the red energy and the blue energy
are separately conserved) but not when it is on, such as when both gases are in the same
volume but at different temperatures.
5.4 Concrete Example: The Boltzmann Equation
Here is a concrete example of a partition of phase space due to Boltzmann. Divide the
1-particle phase space X1 into cells Ci (say, small cubes of equal volume) and count
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(with a given tolerance) the particles in each cell. The macro state is described by the
list ν = (ν1, . . . , νL) of all these occupation numbers; for convenience, we will normalize
them:
νi(x) := fi :=
[
#
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , N} : (qj,vj) ∈ Ci
}
N ∆f volCi
]
∆f (41)
with N∆f the tolerance in counting and [·] again the nearest integer. This example of a
partition Γν = {x ∈ X : ν(x) = ν} is good for dilute, weakly interacting gases but not
in general (Garrido et al., 2004; Goldstein and Lebowitz, 2004) (see also Section 5.8).
Boltzmann considered N billiard balls of radius a in a container Λ ⊂ R3, so X1 =
Λ × R3. In a suitable limit in which N → ∞, a → 0, and the cells Ci become small,
the normalized occupation numbers fi become a continuous density f(q,v). He argued
(convincingly) that for most x ∈ Γν this density, essentially the empirical distribution
of the N particles in X1, will change in time according to the Boltzmann equation,
an integro-differential equation (Boltzmann, 1872, 1898; Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest, 1911;
Lanford, 1976). It reads, in the version appropriate for the hard sphere gas without
external forces, ( ∂
∂t
+ v · ∇q
)
f(q,v, t) = Q(q,v, t) (42)
with the “collision term”
Q(q,v, t) = λ
∫
R3
d3v∗
∫
S2
d2ω 1ω·(v−v∗)>0 ω · (v − v∗)×[
f(q,v′, t) f(q,v′∗, t)− f(q,v, t) f(q,v∗, t)
]
, (43)
involving a constant λ > 0 and the abbreviations
v′ = v − [(v − v∗) · ω]ω (44)
v′∗ = v∗ + [(v − v∗) · ω]ω (45)
for the outgoing velocities of a collision between two balls with incoming velocities v
and v∗ and direction ω between the centers of the two balls. The Boltzmann equation is
considered for v ∈ R3 and q ∈ Λ along with a boundary condition representing that balls
hitting the boundary of Λ get reflected there. A function f(q,v) is a stationary solution
if and only if it is independent of q and a Maxwellian (i.e., Gaussian) in v—that is, if
and only if it represents thermal equilibrium. Correspondingly, non-equilibrium macro
states correspond to any density function f that is not a global (i.e., q-independent)
Maxwellian.
The entropy turns out to be (up to addition of the constant kN and terms of lower
order)
S(x) = −k
∑
i
vol(Ci)Nfi log
[
Nfi
]
. (46)
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In the limit of small Ci, this becomes (9), i.e., −kH in terms of the H functional.
Boltzmann further proved the H-theorem, which asserts that for any solution ft of the
Boltzmann equation,
dH
dt
≤ 0 , (47)
with equality only if f is a local Maxwellian. The H-theorem amounts to a derivation
of the second law relative to the partition {Γν} under consideration.
5.5 Rigorous Result
Some authors suspected that Boltzmann’s vision, and the Boltzmann equation in par-
ticular, was not valid. For example, Khinchin (1941, §33, p. 142) complained about
individualist accounts of entropy:
All existing attempts to give a general proof of this postulate [i.e., S =
k logW ,] must be considered as an aggregate of logical and mathematical
errors superimposed on a general confusion in the definition of the basic
quantities.
But actually, the Boltzmann equation (and with it the increase of entropy) is rigorously
valid for most phase points in Γν , at least for a short time, as proved by Lanford (1975;
1976). Here is a summary statement of Lanford’s theorem, leaving out some technical
details:
Theorem 1. Let t > 0 and λ > 0 (the constant in the Boltzmann equation) be constants.
For a very large number N of billiard balls of (very small) radius a with 4Na2 = λ, for
every 0 ≤ t < 1
5
t, for any nice density f0 in X1 = Λ×R3 with mean free time ≥ t, and
for a coarse graining of X1 into cells Ci that are small but not too small, most phase
points X with empirical distribution f0 (relative to {Ci} and within small tolerances)
evolve in such a way that the empirical distribution of X(t) (relative to {Ci}) is close
to ft, where t
′ 7→ ft′ is the solution of the Boltzmann equation with initial datum f0.
It is believed but not proven that the Boltzmann equation is valid for a much longer
duration, maybe of the order of recurrence times. The method of proof fails after 1
5
t,
but it does not give reason to think that the actual behavior changes at 1
5
t.
Where is the famous Stosszahlansatz, or hypothesis of molecular chaos, in this discus-
sion? This hypothesis was stated by Boltzmann as specifying the approximate number
of collisions with parameter ω between particles from cells Ci and Cj within a small
time interval. In our discussion it is hidden in the assumption that the initial phase
point X(0) be typical in Γν : Both Theorem 1 and the wording (34) of the second law
talk merely about most phase points in Γν , and for most phase points in Γν (ν = f) it
is presumably true that the number of upcoming collisions is, within reasonable toler-
ances, given by the hypothesis of molecular chaos, not just at the initial time but at all
relevant times. We will discuss molecular chaos further in Section 5.7.
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5.6 Empirical vs. Marginal Distribution
Many mathematicians (e.g., Kac (1956); Cercignani et al. (1994) but also Tolman (1938))
considered the Boltzmann equation in a somewhat different context with a different
meaning, viz., with f not the empirical distribution but the marginal distribution. This
means the following.
• The empirical distribution, for a given phase point X = (q1,v1, . . . , qN ,vN) ∈X ,
is the distribution on X1 with density
fXemp(q,v) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ3(qj − q) δ3(vj − v) . (48)
As such, it is not a continuous distribution but becomes roughly continuous-looking
only after coarse graining with cells Ci in X1 that are not too small (so that
the occupation numbers are large enough), and it becomes a really continous
distribution only after taking a limit in which the cells shrink to size 0 while
N →∞ fast enough for the occupation numbers to become very large.
• The marginal distribution starts from a distribution ρ on phase space X and is
obtained by integrating over the positions and velocities of N − 1 particles (and
perhaps averaging over the number i of the particle not integrated out, if ρ was
not permutation invariant to begin with). The marginal distribution can also
be thought of as the average of the (exact) empirical distribution: the empirical
distribution fXemp associated with X ∈X becomes a continuous function when X
is averaged over using a continuous ρ.
For example, Kac (1956, first page) wrote:
f(r, v)dr dv is the average number of molecules in dr dv,
whereas Boltzmann (1898, §3 p. 36) wrote:
let f(ξ, η, ζ, t)dξ dη dζ [. . . ] be the number of m-molecules whose velocity
components in the three coordinate directions lie between the limits ξ and
ξ + dξ, η and η + dη, ζ and ζ + dζ[.]
Note that Kac wrote “average number” and Boltzmann wrote “number”: For Kac, f
was the marginal and for Boltzmann the empirical distribution.6
Of course, the (coarse-grained) empirical distribution is a function of the phase point
X, and so is any functional of it, such as H; thus, the empirical distribution can serve
6That is also why Boltzmann normalized f so that
∫
X1
f = N , not
∫
X1
f = 1: a marginal of a
probability distribution would automatically be normalized to 1, not N , but if f means the empirical
density then it is natural to take it to mean the density of particles in X1, which is normalized to N ,
not 1.
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the role of the macro state ν, and H that of Boltzmann entropy. This is not possible
for the marginal distribution.
So why would anybody want the marginal distribution? Kac aimed at a rigorous
derivation of the Boltzmann equation in whatever context long before Lanford’s theorem,
and saw better chances for a rigorous proof if he assumed collisions to occur at random
times at exactly the rate given by Boltzmann’s hypothesis of molecular chaos. This setup
replaces the time evolution in phase space (or rather, since Kac dropped the positions,
in 3N -dimensional velocity space) by a stochastic process, in fact Markov jump process.
(By the way, as a consequence, any density ρ on 3N -space tends to get wider over
time, and its Gibbs entropy increases, contrary to the Hamiltonian evolution.) So the
mathematician’s aim of finding statements that are easier to prove leads in a different
direction than the aim of discussing the mechanism of entropy increase in nature.
Another thought that may lead authors to the marginal distribution is that f(q,v)
d3q d3v certainly cannot be an integer but must be an infinitesimal, so it cannot be
the number of particles in d3q d3v but must be the average number of particles. Of
course, this thought neglects the idea that as long as N is finite, also the cells Ci should
be kept of finite size and not too small, and the correct statement is that fi volCi is
the number of particles in Ci (or, depending on the normalization of f , N
−1 times the
number of particles); when followers of Boltzmann express the volume of Ci as d
3q d3v,
they merely express themselves loosely.
5.7 The Past Hypothesis
Lanford’s theorem has implications also for negative t: For most phase points in Γf , the
Boltzmann equation also applies in the other time direction, so that entropy increases
in both time directions! (See Figure 3.) That is, before time 0 the Boltzmann equation
applies with the sign of t reversed.
t
S
0
Figure 3: For most phase points in Γν , ν 6= eq, entropy increases in both time directions,
albeit not necessarily at the same rate.
It is generally the case, not just for a dilute gas of hard spheres, that entropy increases
in both time directions for most phase points in Γν . This fact leads to the following
worry: If Lanford’s theorem, or the statement (34), persuaded us to expect that entropy
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increases after the time we chose to call t = 0, should it not persuade us just as much to
expect that entropy decreases before t = 0? But this decrease does not happen. Does
that mean we were unjustified in expecting from Lanford’s theorem or (34) that entropy
increases after t = 0?
Here is a variant of this worry in terms of explanation. Statement (34) may suggest
that the explanation for the increase of entropy after t = 0 is that this happens for
typical phase points X(0). But if we know that entropy was lower before t = 0 than
at t = 0, then X(0) was not typical. This undercuts the explanation considered for the
behavior after t = 0.
Here is the resolution of this worry. The assumption really made by Boltzmann’s
followers is not that the phase point X(0) at the beginning of an experiment is typical
in Γν but the following:
Past hypothesis. The phase point of the universe at the initial time T0
of the universe (presumably the big bang) is typical in its macro set Γν0 ,
where ν0 has very low entropy.
(49)
Here, “typical” means that in relevant ways it behaves like most points in Γν0 . The ways
relevant here are features of the macro history of the universe shared by most points in
Γν0 .
Given that entropy keeps increasing, the initial macro state must be one of extremely
low entropy; one estimate (Penrose, 1989) yields 10123 Joule/Kelvin less than the thermal
equilibrium entropy at the same energy; thus, Γν0 must have extremely small volume
compared to the relevant energy shell. All the same, we do not know very clearly what
ν0 actually is; one proposal is known as the Weyl curvature hypothesis (Penrose, 1979).
A related worry at this point may arise from the observation (for any macroscopic
system or specifically a hard sphere gas as considered for the Boltzmann equation) that
if the time evolution Φt of Γν lies (say) in a macro set Γν′ of much greater volume,
then phase points X(t) coming from X(0) ∈ Γν would be atypical in Γν′ . So if the
prediction of entropy increase after t was based on the assumption that X(t) be typical
in Γν′ , then it could not be applied to X(0) ∈ Γν . So why should entropy still increase
at t > 0? Because Lanford’s theorem says so—at least until t/5. But even after that
time, it is plausible that the Boltzmann equation continues to be valid (and therefore
entropy continues to increase) because it is plausible that the number of upcoming
collisions of each type agrees with the value specified by the hypothesis of molecular
chaos (see, e.g., Lebowitz, 2008). That is because it is plausible that, for typical X(0) ∈
Γν , X(t) contains very special correlations in the exact positions and velocities of all
particles concerning the collisions before t, but not concerning those after t. Likewise,
we would expect for a general macroscopic system, unless the dynamics (as given by the
Hamiltonian) is specially contrived for the partition {Γν}, that X(t) ∈ Γν′ coming from
a typical X(0) ∈ Γν behaves towards the future, but of course not towards the past,
like a typical point in Γν′ , as stated by the second law (34). The whole reasoning does
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not change significantly if Φt(Γν) is distributed over several Γν′1 , . . . ,Γν′` of much greater
volume, instead of being contained in one Γν′ .
Putting this consideration together with the past hypothesis, we are led to expect
that the Boltzmann entropy of the universe keeps increasing (except for occasional
insignificant entropy valleys) to this day, and further until the universe reaches thermal
equilibrium. As a consequence for our present-day experiments:
Development conjecture. Given the past hypothesis, an isolated system
that, at a time t0 before thermal equilibrium of the universe, has macro
state ν appears macroscopically in the future, but not the past, of t0 like
a system that at time t0 is in a typical micro state compatible with ν.
(50)
This statement follows from Lanford’s theorem for times up to t/5, but otherwise has
not been proven mathematically; it summarizes the presumed implications of the past
hypothesis (i.e., of the low entropy initial state of the universe) to applications of statis-
tical mechanics. For a dilute gas, it predicts that its macro state will evolve according
to the Boltzmann equation in the future, but not the past, of t0, as long as it is isolated.
It also predicts that heat will not flow from the cooler body to the hotter, and that a
given macroscopic object will not spontaneously fly into the air although the laws of
mechanics would allow that all the momenta of the thermal motion at some time all
point upwards.
By the way, the development conjecture allows us to make sense of Tolman’s (1938,
§23, p. 60) “hypothesis of equal a priori probabilities,” which asserts
that the phase point for a given system is just as likely to be in one
region of the phase space as in any other region of the same extent which
corresponds equally well with what knowledge we do have as to the condition
of the system.
That sounds like X is always uniformly distributed over the Γν containing X, but
that statement is blatantly inconsistent, as it cannot be true at two times, given that
Φt(Γν) 6= Γν′ for any ν ′. But the subtly different statement (50) is consistent, and (50)
is what Tolman should have written.
The past hypothesis brings out clearly that the origin of the thermodynamic arrow of
time lies in a special property (of lying in Γν0) of the physical state of the matter at the
time T0 of the big bang, and not in the observers’ knowledge or their way of considering
the world. The past hypothesis is the one crucial assumption we make in addition to the
dynamical laws of classical mechanics. The past hypothesis may well have the status of
a law of physics—not a dynamical law but a law selecting a set of admissible histories
among the solutions of the dynamical laws. As Feynman (1965, p. 116) wrote:
Therefore I think it is necessary to add to the physical laws the hypothesis
that in the past the universe was more ordered, in the technical sense, than
it is today—I think this is the additional statement that is needed to make
sense, and to make an understanding of the irreversibility.
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Making the past hypothesis explicit in the form (49) or a similar one also enables us
to understand the question whether the past hypothesis could be explained. Boltzmann
(1898, §90) suggested tentatively that the explanation might be a giant fluctuation out
of thermal equilibrium, an explanation later refuted by Eddington (1931) and Feynman
(1965; 1995). (Another criticism of this explanation put forward by Popper (1976, §35)
is without merit.) Some explanations of the past hypothesis have actually been proposed
in highly idealized models (Carroll, 2010; Barbour et al., 2013, 2014, 2015; Goldstein
et al., 2016); it remains to be seen whether they extend to more adequate cosmological
models.
5.8 Boltzmann Entropy Is Not Always H
Jaynes (1965) wrote that
the Boltzmann H yields an “entropy” that is in error by a nonnegligible
amount whenever interparticle forces affect thermodynamic properties.
It is correct that the H functional represents (up to a factor −k) the Boltzmann entropy
(2) only for a gas of non-interacting or weakly interacting molecules. Let us briefly
explain why; a more extensive discussion is given in (Goldstein and Lebowitz, 2004).
As pointed out in Section 5.1, the coarse grained energy (28) should be one of
the macro variables, so that the partition into macro sets Γν provides a partition of the
energy shell. If interaction cannot be ignored, then the H functional does not correspond
to the Boltzmann entropy, since restriction to the energy shell is not taken into account
by H. When interaction can be ignored there is only kinetic energy, so the Boltzmann
macro states based on the empirical distribution alone determine the energy and hence
the H functional corresponds to the Boltzmann entropy.
6 Gibbs Entropy as Fuzzy Boltzmann Entropy
This section is about another connection between Gibbs and Boltzmann entropy that
is not usually made explicit in the literature; it involves interpreting the Gibbs entropy
in an individualist spirit as a variant of the Boltzmann entropy for “fuzzy” macro sets.
That is, we now describe a kind of Gibbs entropy that is not an ensemblist entropy
(as the Gibbs entropy usually is) but an individualist entropy, which is better. This
possibility is not captured by any of the options (a)–(c) of Section 1.2.
By a fuzzy macro set we mean using functions γν(x) ≥ 0 instead of sets Γν as
expressions of a macro state ν: some phase points x look a lot like ν, others less so,
and γν(x) quantifies how much. The point here is to get rid of the sharp boundaries
between the sets Γν shown in Figure 1, as the boundaries are artificial and somewhat
arbitrary anyway. A partition into sets Γν is still contained in the new framework as a
special case by taking γν to be the indicator function of Γν , γν = 1Γν , but we now also
allow continuous functions γν . One advantage may be to obtain simpler expressions for
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the characterization of ν since we avoid drawing boundaries. The condition that the Γν
form a partition of X can be replaced by the condition that∑
ν
γν(x) = 1 ∀x ∈X . (51)
Another advantage of this framework is that we can allow without further ado that ν is
a continuous variable, by replacing (51) with its continuum version∫
dν γν(x) = 1 ∀x ∈X . (52)
It will sometimes be desirable to normalize the function γν so its integral becomes 1; we
write γ1ν for the normalized function,
γ1ν(x) =
γν(x)
‖γν‖1 with ‖γν‖1 :=
∫
X
dx′ γν(x′) . (53)
So what would be the appropriate generalization of the Boltzmann entropy to a fuzzy
macro state? It should be k times the log of the volume over which γ1ν is effectively
distributed—in other words, the Gibbs entropy,
SB(ν) := SG(γ
1
ν) . (54)
Now fix a phase point x. Since x is now not uniquely associated with a macro state,
it is not clear what SB(x) should be. In view of (52), one might define SB(x) to be
the average
∫
dν SB(ν) γν(x). Be that as it may, if the choice of macro states γν is
reasonable, one would expect that different νs for which γν(x) is significantly non-zero
have similar values of SB(ν), except perhaps for a small set of exceptional xs.
Another advantage of fuzzy macro states is that they sometimes factorize in a more
convenient way. Here is an example. To begin with, sometimes, when we are only
interested in thermal equilibrium macro states, we may want to drop non-equilibrium
macro states and replace the equilibrium set Γeq in an energy shell X(E−∆E,E] by the
full energy shell, thereby accepting that we attribute wildly inappropriate νs (and SBs)
to a few xs. As a second step, the canonical distribution
ρcan(β, x) =
1
Z
e−βH(x) (55)
is strongly concentrated in a very narrow range of energies, a fact well known as “equiv-
alence of ensembles” (between the micro-canonical and the canonical ensemble). Let us
take ν = β and γ1ν(x) = ρcan(β, x) as a continuous family of fuzzy macro states. As a
third step, consider a system consisting of two non-interacting subsystems,S = S1∪S2,
so X =X1 ×X2, x = (x1, x2) and H(x) = H1(x1) +H2(x2). Then γ1β factorizes,
γ1β(x) = γ
1
1,β(x1) γ
1
2,β(x2) , (56)
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whereas the energy shells do not,
X(E−∆E,E] 6=X1,(E1−∆E1,E1] ×X2,(E2−∆E2,E2] , (57)
because a prescribed total energy E can be obtained as a sum E1 +E2 for very different
values of E1 through suitable choice of E2, corresponding to different macro states for
S1 and S2. One particular splitting E = E1 +E2 will have the overwhelming majority
of phase space volume in X(E−∆E,E]; it is the splitting that maximizes S1(E1) + S2(E2)
under the constraint E1 + E2 = E, and at the same time the one corresponding to the
same β value, i.e., with Ei the expectation of Hi(xi) under the distribution γ
1
i,β (i =
1, 2). So equality in (57) fails only by a small amount, in the sense that the symmetric
difference set between the left and right-hand sides has small volume compared to the
sets themselves. In short, in this situation, the use of sets Γν forces us to consider
certain non-equilibrium macro states, and if we prefer to introduce only equilibrium
mecro states, then the use of fuzzy macro states γν is convenient.
The quantum analog of fuzzy macro states consists of, instead of the orthogonal
decomposition (11) of Hilbert space, a POVM (positive-operator-valued measure) Gˆ on
the set M of macro states. That is, we replace the projection Pˆν to the macro space
Hν by a positive operator Gˆν with spectrum in [0, 1] such that
∑
ν Gˆν = Iˆ, where Iˆ is
the identity operator on H . The eigenvalues of Gˆν would then express how much the
corresponding eigendirection looks like ν. Set Gˆ1ν := (tr Gˆν)
−1Gˆν ; then Gˆ1ν is a density
matrix, and the corresponding entropy value would be
SqB(ν) := SvN(Gˆ
1
ν) . (58)
As before when using the Hν , a quantum state ψ may be associated with several very
different νs. As discussed around (16), this problem presumably disappears in Bohmian
mechanics and collapse theories.
7 The Status of Ensembles
If we use the Boltzmann entropy, then the question of what the ρ in the Gibbs entropy
means does not come up. But a closely related question remains: What is the meaning
of the Gibbs ensembles (the micro-canonical, the canonical, the grand-canonical) in
Boltzmann’s “individualist” approach? This is the topic of the present section (see also
Goldstein, 2019).
By way of introduction to this section, we can mention that Wallace, an ensemb-
list, feels the force of arguments against subjective entropy but thinks that there is no
alternative. He wrote (Wallace, 2019, Sec. 10):
It will be objected by (e.g.) Albert and Callender that when we say “my
coffee will almost certainly cool to room temperature if I leave it” we are
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saying something objective about the world, not something about my beliefs.
I agree, as it happens; that just tells us that the probabilities of statistical
mechanics cannot be interpreted epistemically. And then, of course, it is a
mystery how they can be interpreted, given that the underlying dynamics is
deterministic [. . . ]. But (on pain of rejecting a huge amount of solid empirical
science [. . . ]) some such interpretation must be available.
The considerations of this section may be helpful here.
It is natural to call any measure (or density function ρ) that is normalized to 1
a “probability distribution.” But now we need to distinguish more carefully between
different roles that such a measure may play:
(i) frequency in repeated preparation: The outcome of an experiment is unpredictable,
but will follow the distribution ρ if we repeat the experiment over and over. (This
kind of probability could also be called genuine probability or probability in the
narrow sense.)
(ii) degree of belonging: As in Section 6, ρ could represent a fuzzy set; then ρ(x)
indicates how strongly x belongs to this fuzzy set.
(iiii) typicality: This is how the flat distribution over a certain Γν enters the past
hypothesis (49) and the development conjecture (50).
7.1 Typicality
A bit more elucidation of the concept of typicality may be useful here, as the difference
between typicality and genuine probability is subtle. A feature or behavior is said
to be typical in a set S if it occurs for most (i.e., for the overwhelming majority of)
elements of S. Let us elaborate on this by means of an example. The digits of pi,
314159265358979. . . , look very much like a random sequence although there is nothing
random about the number pi, as it is uniquely defined and thus fully determined. Also,
there is no way of “repeating the experiment” that would yield a different sequence of
digits; we can only do statistics about the digits in this one sequence. We can set up
reasonable criteria for whether a given sequence (finite or infinite) “looks random,” such
as whether the relative frequency of each digits is, within suitable tolerances, 1/10, and
that of each k-digit subsequence 1/10k (for all k much smaller than the length of the
sequence). Then the digits of pi will presumably pass the criteria, thereby illustrating
the fine but relevant distinction between “looking random” and “being random.”
Looking random is an instance of typical behavior, as most sequences of digits of
given length look random and most numbers between 3 and 4 have random-looking dec-
imal expansions—“most” relative to the uniform distribution, also known as Lebesgue
measure. So with respect to a certain behavior (say, the frequencies of k-digit subse-
quences), pi presumably is like most numbers.
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Similarly, with respect to another sort of behavior (say, the future macroscopic his-
tory of the universe), the initial phase point of the universe is presumably like most
points in Γν0 , as demanded by the past hypothesis (49); and according to the develop-
ment conjecture (50), the phase point of a closed system now is like most points in its
macro set.
In contrast, when considering a random experiment in probability theory, we usually
imagine that we can repeat the experiment, with relative frequencies in agreement with
the distribution ρ; that is clearly impossible for the universe as a whole (or, if it were
possible, irrelevant, because we are not concerned with what happens in other universes).
But even if an experiment, such as the preparation of a macroscopic body (say, a gas),
can be repeated a hundred or a thousand times, the frequency distribution of the sample
points (i.e., the empirical distribution (48)) consists of a mere 103 delta peaks and thus
is far from resembling a continuous distribution in a phase space of 1023 dimensions,
so we do not have much basis for claiming that it is essentially the same as the micro-
canonical or the canonical or any other common ensemble ρ. On the other hand, even
a single sample point could meaningfully be said to be typical with respect to a certain
high-dimensional distribution ρ (and a certain concept of which kinds of “behavior” are
being considered). What we are getting at is that Gibbs’s ensembles are best understood
as measures of typicality, not of genuine probability.
For example, there is a subtle difference between the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution
and the canonical distribution. The former is the empirical distribution of (say) 1023
points in 6-dimensional 1-particle phase space X1, while the latter is a distribution
of a single or a few points in high-dimensional phase space. The former is genuine
probability, the latter typicality. This contrast is also related to the contrast between
empirical and marginal distribution: On the one hand, the canonical distribution of a
system S1 is often derived as a marginal distribution of the micro-canonical distribution
of an even bigger system S1 ∪S2, and a marginal of a typicality distribution is still a
typicality distribution. On the other hand, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution is the
empirical distribution that arises from most phase points relative to the micro-canonical
distribution. If ρ-most phase points lead to the empirical distribution f , then that
explains why we can regard f as a genuine probability distribution, in the sense of being
objective.
7.2 Equivalence of Ensembles and Typicality
It is not surprising that typicality and genuine probability can easily be conflated, and
that various conundrums can arise from that. For example, the “mentaculus” of Albert
and Loewer (Albert, 2015; Loewer, 2019) is a view based on understanding the past
hypothesis (49) with genuine probability instead of typicality. That is, in this view
one considers the uniform distribution over the initial macro set Γν0 and regards it as
defining “the” probability distribution of the micro history t 7→ X(t) of the universe,
in particular as assigning a precisely defined value in [0, 1] as the probability to every
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conceivable event, for example the event that intelligent life forms evolve on Earth and
travel to the moon.
In contrast, the typicality approach used in (49) does not require or claim that
the initial phase point X(T0) of the universe is random, merely that it looks random
(just as pi merely looks random). Furthermore, the typicality view does not require a
uniquely selected measure of typicality, just as pi is presumably typical relative to several
measures: the uniform distribution on the interval [3, 4] or on [0, 10], or some Gaussian
distribution. We elaborate on this aspect in the subsequent paragraphs, again through
contrast with Albert and Loewer.
Loewer once expressed (personal communication 2018) that different measures ρ1 6=
ρ2 for the initial phase point of the universe would necessarily lead to different observable
consequences. That is actually not right; let us explain. To begin with, one may think
that ρ1 and ρ2 must lead to different observable consequences if one defines (following the
mentaculus) the probability of any event E at time t as P (E) =
∫
Φ−1t (E)
ρi. However,
a definition alone does not ensure that the quantity P (E) has empirical significance;
the question arises whether observers inside the universe can determine P (E) from their
observations. More basically, we need to ask whether observers can determine from their
observations which of ρ1 and ρ2 was used as the initial distribution. To this end, let us
imagine that the initial phase point X(T0) of the universe gets chosen truly randomly
with distribution either ρ1 or ρ2. Now the same point X(T0) may be compatible with
both distributions ρ1, ρ2 if they overlap appropriately. Since all observations must be
made in the one history arising from X(T0), and since the universe cannot be re-run
with an independent initial phase point, it is impossible to decide empirically whether
ρ1 or ρ2 was the distribution according to which X(T0) was chosen. Further thought
in this direction shows that observers can only reliably distinguish between ρ1 and ρ2 if
they can observe an event that has probability near 1 for ρ1 and near 0 for ρ2 or vice
versa; that is, they can only determine the typicality class of the initial distribution.
(As a consequence for the mentaculus, its main work, which is to efficiently convey hard
core facts about the world corresponding to actual patterns of events over space and
time, is done via typicality, i.e., concerns only events with measure near 0 or near 1.)
In the typicality view there does not have to be a fact about which distribution ρ is
“the right” distribution of the initial phase point of the universe; that is because points
typical relative to ρ1 are also typical relative to ρ2 and vice versa, if ρ1 and ρ2 are not
too different. Put differently, in the typicality view there is a type of equivalence of
ensembles, parallel to the well known fact that one can often replace a micro-canonical
ensemble by a canonical one without observable consequences. There is room for dif-
ferent choices of ρ, and this fits well with the fact that Γν0 has boundaries with some
degree of arbitrariness.
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7.3 Ensemblist vs. Individualist Notions of Thermal Equilib-
rium
The two notions of Gibbs and Boltzmann entropy are parallel to two notions of thermal
equilibrium. In the view that we call the ensemblist view, a system is in thermal
equilibrium if and only if its phase point X is random with the appropriate distribution
(such as the micro-canonical or the canonical distribution). In the individualist view, in
contrast, a system is in thermal equilibrium (at a given energy) if and only if its phase
point X lies in a certain subset Γeq of phase space.
The definition of this set may be quite complex; for example, according to the par-
tition due to Boltzmann described in (41), the set Γeq contains those phase points for
which the relative number of particles in each cell Ci of X1 agrees, up to tolerance ∆f ,
with the content of Ci under the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. In general, the task of
selecting the set Γeq has similarities with that of selecting the set S of those sequences of
(large) length L of decimal digits that “look random.” While a reasonable test of “looks
random” can be designed (such as outlined in the first paragraph of Section 7.1 above),
different scientists may well come up with criteria that do not exactly agree, and again
there is some arbitrariness in where exactly to “draw the boundaries.” Moreover, such
a test or definition S is often unnecessary for practical purposes, even for designing and
testing pseudo-random number generators. For practical purposes, it usually suffices to
specify the distribution (here, the uniform distribution over all sequences of length L)
with the understanding that S should contain, in a reasonable sense, the typical points
relative to that distribution. Likewise, we usually never go to the trouble of actually
selecting Γeq and the other Γν : it often suffices to imagine that they could be selected.
Specifically, for thermal equilibrium, it often suffices to specify the distribution (here,
the uniform distribution over the energy shell, that is, the micro-canonical distribution)
with the understanding that Γeq should contain, in a reasonable sense, the typical points
relative to that distribution (i.e., points that look macroscopically the way most points
in Xmc do).
That is why, also for the individualist, specifying an ensemble ρ can be a convenient
way of describing a thermal equilibrium state: It would basically specify the set Γeq as
the set of those points x that look macroscopically like ρ-most points. For the same
reasons as in Section 7.2, this does not depend sensitively on ρ: points typical relative
to the micro-canonical ensemble near energy E are also typical relative to the canonical
ensemble with mean energy E.
Let us turn to the ensemblist view. The basic problem with the ensemblist definition
of thermal equilibrium is the same as with the Gibbs entropy: a system has an X but
not a ρ. To say the least, it remains open what should be meant by ρ. Is it subjective?
But whether or not a system is in thermal equilibrium is not subjective. Does that
mean that in distant places with no observers around, no system can be in thermal
equilibrium? That does not sound right.
What if ρ corresponded to a repeated preparation procedure? That is problematical
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as well. Suppose such a procedure produced a random phase pointX(0) that is uniformly
distributed in some set M ; now let time evolve up to t; the resulting phase point X(t)
is uniformly distributed in Φt(M), the associated Gibbs entropy is constant, and so the
distribution of X(t) is far from thermal equilibrium. In other words, the system never
approaches thermal equilibrium. That does not sound right. We will come back to this
point in Section 8.
Moreover, thermal equilibrium should have something to do with physical behavior,
which depends on X. Thermal equilibrium should mean that the temperature, let us
say the energy per degree of freedom, is constant (within tolerances) throughout the
volume of the system, and that is a property of X. Thermal equilibrium should mean
that the values of macro variables, which are functions on phase space, are constant over
time, and that is true of some X and not of others.
7.4 Ergodicity and Mixing
Ergodic and mixing are two kinds of chaoticity properties of a dynamical system Y such
as an energy surface in phase space. A measure-preserving dynamical system in Y is
called ergodic if almost every trajectory spends time, in the long run, in all regions of
Y according to their volumes. Equivalently, a system is ergodic if time averages almost
surely equal phase averages. A measure-preserving dynamical system in Y is called
mixing if for all subsets A,B of Y , vol(A ∩ Φt(B)) tends to vol(A) vol(B)/ vol(Y ) as
t→∞. In other words, mixing means that for large t, Φt(B) will be deformed into all
regions of phase space according to their volumes.
It is sometimes claimed (e.g., Mackey (1989)) that ergodicity or mixing are crucial
for statistical mechanics. We would like to explain now why that is not so—with a few
caveats; see also Cerino et al. (2016).
• Mixing would seem relevant to the ensemblist approach to thermal equilibrium be-
cause mixing implies that the uniform distribution over Φt(B) converges setwise to
the uniform distribution (Liouville measure) over the energy surface Y (and every
density converges weakly to a constant) (Krylov, 1979; Ruelle, 2007). However,
for every finite t, the Gibbs entropy has not increased, so some ensemblists are
pushed to say that the entropy does not increase within finite time, but jumps at
t = ∞ to the thermal equilibrium value. Thus, some ensemblists are pushed to
regard thermal equilibrium as an idealization that never occurs in the real world.
That does not seem like an attractive option.
• The fact that the observed thermal equilibrium value aeq of a macro variable A co-
incides with its micro-canonical average 〈A〉 has sometimes been explained through
the following reasoning (e.g., Khinchin, 1941, § 9): Any macro measurement takes
a time that is long compared to the time that collisions take or the time of free
flight between collisions. Thus, it can be taken to be infinite on the micro time
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scale. Thus, the measured value is actually not the value of A(X(t)) at a partic-
ular t but rather its time average. By ergodicity, the time average is equal to the
phase average, QED.
This reasoning is incorrect. In fact, ergodicity is neither necessary nor sufficient
for aeq = 〈A〉. Not necessary because A is nearly constant over the energy surface,
so most phase points will yield a value close to 〈A〉 even if the motion is not
ergodic. And not sufficient because the time needed for the phase point of an
ergodic system to explore an energy surface is of the order 10N years and thus
much longer than the duration of the measurement. This point is also illustrated
by the fact that in a macro system with non-uniform temperature, you can clearly
measure unequal temperatures in different places with a thermometer faster than
the temperature equilibrates.
• Still, ergodicity and similar properties are not completely unrelated to thermo-
dynamic behavior. Small interactions between different parts of the system are
needed to drive the system towards a dominant macro set (i.e., towards thermal
equilibrium), and the same small interactions often also have the consequence of
making the dynamics ergodic. That is, ergodicity is neither cause nor consequence
of thermodynamic behavior, but the two have a common cause.
• In addition, and aside from thermodynamic behavior or entropy increase, mixing
and similar properties play a role for the emergence of macroscopic randomness.
For example, suppose a coin is tossed or a die is rolled; chaotic properties of the
dynamics ensure that the outcome as a function of the initial condition varies over
a very small scale on phase space, with the consequence that a probability density
over the initial conditions that varies over a larger scale will lead to a uniform
probability distribution of the outcome. (For more extensive discussion see (Du¨rr
and Teufel, 2009, Sec. 4.1).)
• Boltzmann himself considered ergodicity, but not for the purposes above. He used
it as a convenient assumption for estimating the mean free path of a gas molecule
(Boltzmann, 1898, §10).
7.5 Remarks
Of course, Boltzmannian individualists use probability, too. There is no problem with
considering procedures that prepare random phase points, or with using Gibbs ensembles
as measures of typicality.
When arguing against the individualist view, Wallace (2019, Sec. 4) mentioned as
an example that transport coefficients (such as thermal conductivity) can be computed
using the two-time correlation function
Cij(t) = 〈Xi(t)Xj(0)〉 , (59)
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where 〈·〉 means averaging while taking X(0) as random with micro-canonical distribu-
tion. Wallace wrote:
since C(t) is an explicitly probabilistic quantity, it is not even defined on
the Boltzmannian approach.
Actually, that is not correct. The individualist will be happy as soon as it is shown that
for most phase points in Xmc, the rate of heat conduction is practically constant and
can be computed from C(t) in the way considered.
Another objection of Wallace’s (2019, Sec. 5) concerns a system S for which (say)
two macro sets, Γν1 and Γν2 , each comprise nearly half of the volume of the energy
shell, so that the thermal equilibrium state is replaced by two macro states ν1 and ν2,
as can occur with a ferromagnet (see Footnote 5 in Section 5.1). Wallace asked how
an individualist can explain the empirical observation that the system is, in the long
run, equally likely to reach ν1 or ν2. To begin with, if a preparation procedure leads
to a random phase point with distribution ρ, then
∫
Φ−1t (Γν1 )
ρ is the probability of S
being in ν1 at time t. As mentioned in Section 7.4 (penultimate bullet), a broad ρ will
lead to approximately equal probabilities for ν1 and ν2. This leads to the question why
practical procedures lead to broad ρs, and that comes from typicality as expressed in the
development conjecture. Put differently, for a large number of identical ferromagnets it
is typical that about half of them are in ν1 and about half of them in ν2.
8 Second Law for the Gibbs Entropy?
To the observation that the Gibbs entropy is constant under the Liouville evolution (6),
different authors have reacted in different ways. We describe some reactions along with
some comments of ours. (Of course, our basic reservations about the Gibbs entropy are
those we expressed in Section 4.)
• Khinchin (1941) thought it was simply wrong to say that entropy increases in a
closed system. He thought that the second law should merely assert that when a
system is in thermal equilibrium and a constraint is lifted, then the new thermal
equilibrium state has higher entropy than the previous one.
With this attitude one precludes the explanation of many phenomena.
• Ruelle (2007) expressed the view that entropy stays constant at every finite time
but increases at t =∞ due to mixing (see Section 7.4 above).
It remains unclear how this view can be applied to any real-world situation, in
which all times are finite.
• Some authors (e.g., Mackey (1989)) suggested considering a system S1 perturbed
by external noise (in the same spirit Kemble (1939)). In the framework of closed
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Hamiltonian systems of finite size, this situation could be represented by interac-
tion with another system S2. It can be argued that if S2 is large and if initially
ρ = ρ1(x1) ρ2(x2) with ρ2 a thermal equilibrium distribution, then the marginal
distribution
ρmarg1 (x1, t) :=
∫
X2
dx2 ρ(x1, x2, t) (60)
will follow an evolution for which SG(ρ
marg
1 ) increases with time, and one might
want to regard the latter quantity as the entropy of S1.
This attitude has some undesirable consequences: First, if the entropy of S1
increases and that of S2 increases then, since that of S1∪S2 is constant, entropy
is not additive. Second, since it is not true of all ρ on X1 ×X2 that SG(ρmarg1 )
increases with time, the question arises for which ρ it will increase, and why real-
world systems should be of that type.
• Some authors (e.g., Wallace, 2019; Tolman, 1938, § 51) have considered a partition
of (an energy shell in) phase spaceX , such as the Γν , and suggested coarse graining
any ρ according this partition.7 That is, the coarse-grained ρ is the function Pρ
whose value at x ∈ Γν is the average of ρ over Γν ,
Pρ(x) =
1
vol Γν
∫
Γν
dy ρ(y) . (61)
P is a projection to the subspace of L1(X ) of functions that are constant on every
Γν . The suggestion is that thermodynamic entropy St is given by
St := SG(Pρt) , (62)
with ρt evolving according to the Liouville equation (6), and that this St tends to
increase with time.
It is plausible that St indeed tends to increase, provided that the time evolution has
good mixing properties (so that balls in phase space quickly become “spaghetti”)
and that the scale of variation of ρ0 is not small; see also Falcioni et al. (2007).
(The argument for the increase of (62) given by Tolman (1938) is without merit.
After correctly showing (p. 169) that, for every distribution ρ,
SG(Pρ) ≥ SG(ρ) , (63)
Tolman assumes that ρ0 is uniform in each cell, i.e., Pρ0 = ρ0, and then points
out that SG(Pρt) ≥ SG(Pρ0) for all t. This is true, but it is merely a trivial
consequence of (63) and (5) owed to the special setup for which Pρ0 = ρ0, and
not a general statement of entropy increase, as nothing follows about whether
SG(Pρt2) > SG(Pρt1) for arbitrary t2 > t1.)
7Tolman (1938) had in mind a partition into cells of equal size, but we will simply use the Γν in the
following.
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• Some authors have argued that the Liouville evolution (6) is not appropriate for
evolving ρ.
That depends on what ρ means. If we imagine a preparation procedure that
produces a random phase point X(0) with probability distribution ρ0, then letting
the system evolve up to time t will lead to a random phase point X(t) with
distribution ρt given by the Liouville evolution. However, if we think of ρ as
representing an observer’s belief or knowledge, the situation may be different. In
the last two bullet points, we consider some alternative ways of evolution.
• Let L be the linear differential operator such that Lρ is the right-hand side of the
Liouville equation (6); then the Liouville evolution is ρt = e
Ltρ0. The proposal (62)
could be re-expressed by saying that when using the Gibbs entropy, St = SG(ρt),
the appropriate evolution for ρ should be
ρt = Pe
Ltρ0 for t > 0 . (64)
• Instead of (64), some authors (Mackey, 1989) suggested that
ρt = lim
n→∞
(PeLt/n)nρ0 for t > 0 . (65)
This evolution corresponds to continually coarse graining ρ after each infinitesimal
time step of Liouville evolution.
Then the Gibbs entropy SG(ρt) is indeed non-decreasing with t, in fact without ex-
ception, as a consequence of (63) and (5). If the macro evolution is deterministic,
then it should agree with the Boltzmann entropy. A stochastic macro evolution
would yield additional contributions to the Gibbs entropy not present in the Boltz-
mann entropy (contributions arising from spread over many macro sets), but these
contributions are presumably tiny. Furthermore, it seems not implausible that ρt
is often close to PeLtPρ0, which implies that SG(ρt) is close to the expectation
of SB(Xt) with X0 random with distribution Pρ0. However, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1, one should distinguish between the entropy and the average entropy, so
SG(ρt) is sometimes not quite the right quantity.
9 Further Aspects of the Quantum Case
Much of what we have discussed in the classical setting re-appears mutatis mutandis
in the quantum case, and we will focus now on the differences and specialties of the
quantum case. We are considering a quantum system of a macroscopic number N (say,
> 1023) of particles. Its Hilbert space can be taken to be finite-dimensional because we
can take the systems we consider to be enclosed in a finite volume of 3-space, which leads
to a discrete spectrum of the Hamiltonian and thus only finitely many eigenvalues in
every finite energy interval. As a consequence, if we cut off high energies at an arbitrary
level, or if we consider an energy shell H(E−∆E,E], we are left with a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space of relevant pure states.
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9.1 Macro Spaces
The orthogonal decompositionH = ⊕νHν into macro spaces can be thought of as aris-
ing from macro observables as follows, following von Neumann (1929). If Aˆ1, . . . , AˆK are
quantum observables (self-adjoint operators on H ) that should serve as macro observ-
ables, we will want to coarse grain them according to the resolution ∆Mj of macroscopic
measurements by introducing Bˆj = [Aˆj/∆Mj]∆Mj (with [·] again the nearest integer),
thereby grouping nearby eigenvalues of Aˆj together into a single, highly degenerate
eigenvalue of Bˆj. Due to their macroscopic character, the commutators [Bˆj, Bˆk] will be
small; as von Neumann (1929) argued and Ogata (2013) justified, a little correction will
make them commute exactly, Mˆj ≈ Bˆj and [Mˆj, Mˆk] = 0. Since a macro description ν of
the system can be given by specifying the eigenvalues (m1, . . . ,mK) of all Mˆ1, . . . , MˆK ,
their joint eigenspaces are the macro spaces Hν . They have dimensions of order 1010
23
.
9.2 Some Historical Approaches
Pauli (1928) tried to derive entropy increase from quantum mechanics. In fact, he
described several approaches. In §1 of his paper, he developed a modified Boltzmann
equation that takes Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics into account and makes
sense in the individualist view; in §2 he took an ensemblist attitude and suggested a
novel dynamics in the form of a Markov chain on the macro states ν, for which he
proved that the (analog of the) Gibbs entropy of the probability distribution increases
with time; in §3 and 4, he argued (not convincingly, to our minds) that the distribution
over ν’s provided by an evolving quantum state is, to a good degree of approximation,
a Markov chain.
Returning to Pauli’s §1, we note that his derivation of the modified Boltzmann
equation is far less complete than Boltzmann’s derivation of the Boltzmann equation
from classical dynamics of hard spheres, and no validity theorem analogous to Lanford’s
has been proven for it, as far as we are aware. So Pauli’s description has rather the
status of a conjecture. According to it, the macro evolution ν(t) of a quantum gas
with N particles is deterministic for large N (as with the Boltzmann equation), the
expression for the entropy of ν agrees with the quantum Boltzmann entropy SqB(ν)
as in (12), and it increases with time as a mathematical consequence of the evolution
equation for ν(t). This approach fits into the framework of an orthogonal decomposition
H = ⊕νHν that arises in a way analogous to Boltzmann’s example (41) from an
orthogonal decomposition of the 1-particle Hilbert space, H1 = ⊕iKi, by taking ν to be
the list of occupation numbers (within tolerances) of each Ki andHν the corresponding
subspaces of H .
Von Neumann famously came up with the von Neumann entropy (10), the quantum
analog of the Gibbs entropy. It is less known that in 1929 he defended a different formula
because (von Neumann, 1929, Sec. 1.3)
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[t]he expressions for entropy [of the form −k tr ρˆ log ρˆ] are not applicable
here in the way they were intended, as they were computed from the per-
spective of an observer who can carry out all measurements that are possible
in principle—i.e., regardless of whether they are macroscopic[.]
We see here a mix of ensemblist and individualist thoughts in von Neumann’s words.
Be that as it may, the formula that von Neumann defended was, in our notation,
S(ψ) = −k
∑
ν
‖Pˆνψ‖2 log ‖Pˆνψ‖
2
dimHν
. (66)
Similar expressions were advocated recently by Safranek et al. (2017; 2018). Note that
this expression has a stronger individualist character than −k tr ρˆ log ρˆ, as it ascribes
a non-trivial entropy value also to a system in a pure state. The problem with the
expression is that it tends to average different entropy values where no averaging is
appropriate. For example, suppose that ψ has contributions from many but not too
many macro spaces; since dimHν is very large, ‖Pˆνψ‖2 log ‖Pˆνψ‖2 can be neglected
in comparison, and then (66) is just the weighted average of the quantum Boltzmann
entropies (12) of different macro states, weighted with ‖Pˆνψ‖2. But in many situations,
such as Schro¨dinger’s cat, we would not be inclined to regard this average value as the
true entropy value valid in all cases. For comparison, we would also not be inclined to
define the body temperature of Schro¨dinger’s cat as the average over all contributions to
the wave function—we would say that the quantum state is a superposition of states with
significantly different body temperatures. Likewise, we should say that the quantum
state is a superposition of states with significantly different entropies.
In the same paper, von Neumann (1929) proved two theorems that he called the
“quantum H theorem” and the “quantum ergodic theorem.” However, they are not
at all quantum analogs of either the H theorem or the ergodic theorem. In fact, the
two 1929 theorems are very similar to each other (almost reformulations of each other),
and they assert that for a typical Hamiltonian or a typical choice of the decomposition
H = ⊕νHν , all initial pure states ψ0 evolve such that for most t in the long run,
‖Pˆνψ(t)‖2 ≈ dimHν
dimH
. (67)
(See also Goldstein et al. (2010b).) This is an interesting observation about the quantum
evolution that has no classical analog; but it is far from establishing the increase of
entropy in quantum mechanics.
9.3 Entanglement Entropy
Let us come back to option (d) of Section 3.1 above: the possibility that the density
matrix ρˆ in SvN should be the system’s reduced density matrix. This approach has the
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undesirable consequence that entropy is not extensive, i.e., the entropy of S1 ∪ S2 is
not the sum of the entropy of S1 and the entropy of S2; after all, often the entropies
of S1 and S2 will each increase while that of S1 ∪ S2 is constant if that is a closed
system (because the evolution is unitary). Moreover, it is not true of all ρˆ on H1 ⊗H2
that SvN(tr2 ρˆ) increases with time (think of time reversal).
A variant of option (d), and another widespread approach to defining the entropy of
a macroscopic quantum system S with (say) a pure state Ψ, is to use the entanglement
entropy as follows: Divide S into small subsystems S1, . . . ,SM , let ρˆj be the reduced
density matrix of Sj,
ρˆj := tr1 · · · trj−1 trj+1 · · · trM |Ψ〉〈Ψ| , (68)
and add up the von Neumann entropies of ρˆj,
Sent := −k
M∑
j=1
tr(ρˆj log ρˆj) . (69)
Since the j-th term quantifies how strongly Sj is entangled with the rest of S , it is
known as the entanglement entropy of Sj. We will simply call also their sum (69) the
entanglement entropy.
In thermal equilibrium, the entanglement entropy Sent actually agrees with the ther-
modynamic entropy. That is a consequence of microscopic thermal equilibrium as de-
scribed in Section 3.3, and thus of canonical typicality (Gemmer et al., 2004; Goldstein
et al., 2006; Popescu et al., 2006): For most Ψ in an energy shell of S , assuming that
the Sj are not too large (Goldstein et al., 2017b), ρˆj is approximately canonical, so its
entanglement entropy agrees with its thermodynamic entropy, and extensivity implies
the same for S .
This argument also shows that for S in thermal equilibrium, Sent does not depend
much on how S is split into subsystems Sj. On top of that, it also shows that Sent
still yields the correct value of entropy when S is in local thermal equilibrium, provided
each Sj is so small as to be approximately in thermal equilibrium.
Many practical examples of non-equilibrium systems are in local thermal equilibrium.
Still, for general non-equilibrium systems, Sent may yield wrong values; an artificial
example is provided by a product state Ψ = ⊗jψj with each ψj an equilibrium state
of Sj, so Sent = 0 while the thermodynamic entropy, by extensivity, should have its
equilibrium value. Artificial or not, this example at least forces us to say that Sent is
not correct for all Ψ; that Sent is correct for most Ψ we knew already since most Ψ are
in thermal equilibrium.
Another issue with Sent arises when S is in a macroscopic superposition such as
Schro¨dinger’s cat. Then Sent yields approximately the average of the entropy of a live
cat and that of a dead cat, while the correct value would be either that of a live cat
or that of a dead cat. In this situation one may want to conditionalize on the case of
(say) the cat being alive, and replace Ψ by the part of it corresponding to a live cat.
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Ultimately, this leads us to replace Ψ by its projection to oneHν , and if we are so lucky
that states in Hν are in local thermal equilibrium, then the conditionalized Sent will
agree with SqB(ν). So at the end of the day, SqB seems to be our best choice as the
fundamental definition of entropy in quantum mechanics.
9.4 Increase of Quantum Boltzmann Entropy
Just as the classical macro sets Γν have vastly different volumes, the quantum macro
spaces Hν have vastly different dimensions, and as phase space volume is conserved
classically, dimensions of subspaces are conserved under unitary evolution.
It follows that if macro states ν follow an autonomous, deterministic evolution law
ν 7→ νt, then quantum Boltzmann entropy increases. In fact,
if e−iHˆtHν ⊆Hν′ , then SqB(ν ′) ≥ SqB(ν). (70)
More generally, not assuming that macro states evolve deterministically, already
at this point it is perhaps not unreasonable to expect that in some sense the unitary
evolution will carry a pure state ψt from smaller to larger subspaces Hν . In fact, it was
proven (Goldstein et al., 2010a) that if one subspace has most of the dimensions in an
energy shell, then ψt will sooner or later come very close to that subspace (i.e., reach
thermal equilibrium) and stay close to it for an extraordinarily long time (i.e., for all
practical purposes, never leave it).
Proposition 1 below is another observation in the direction of Conjecture 1, concern-
ing only two times instead of an entire history and only two macro states ν, ν ′. It is a
quantum analog of the classical statement that if
vol Γν′  vol Γν , (71)
that is, if SB(ν
′) is less than SB(ν) by an appreciable amount, then for any t 6= 0, most
X0 ∈ Γν are such that Xt /∈ Γν′ .
Proposition 1. Let Hˆ and t 6= 0 be arbitrary but fixed. If
dimHν′  dimHν (72)
(that is, if SqB(ν
′) is less than SqB(ν) by an appreciable amount), then for most ψ0 ∈
S(Hν), ∥∥Pˆν′ψt∥∥2  1 . (73)
Proof. Let Uˆ = e−iHˆt, let dν := dimHν , and let Ψ be a random vector with uniform
distribution on S(Hν). Then
E|Ψ〉〈Ψ| = d−1ν Pˆν , (74)
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so
E‖Pˆν′UˆΨ‖2 = tr(Pˆν′Uˆd−1ν PˆνUˆ−1) (75)
= d−1ν tr(Uˆ
−1Pˆν′Uˆ Pˆν) (76)
≤ d−1ν tr(Uˆ−1Pˆν′Uˆ) (77)
= d−1ν tr(Pˆν′) (78)
=
dimHν′
dimHν
 1 . (79)
If a non-negative quantity is small on average, it must be small in most cases, so the
proposition follows.
Note that the proof only used that Hν′ and Hν are two mutually orthogonal sub-
spaces of suitable dimensions; as a consequence, the statement remains true if we replace
Hν′ by the sum of all macro spaces with dimension less than that of Hν . That is, if
Hν is much bigger than all of the smaller macro spaces together (a case that is not
unrealistic), then it is atypical for entropy to be lower at time t than at time 0.
10 Conclusions
We have argued that entropy has nothing to do with the knowledge of observers. The
Gibbs entropy (1) is an efficient tool for computing entropy values in thermal equilibrium
when applied to the Gibbsian equilibrium ensembles ρ, but the fundamental definition of
entropy is the Boltzmann entropy (2). We have discussed the status of the two notions of
entropy and of the corresponding two notions of thermal equilibrium, the “ensemblist”
and the “individualist” view. Gibbs’s ensembles are very useful, in particular as they
allow the efficient computation of thermodynamic functions (Goldstein, 2019), but their
role can only be understood in Boltzmann’s individualist framework. We have also
outlined an extension of Boltzmann’s framework to quantum mechanics by formulating
a definition of the quantum Boltzmann entropy and, as Conjecture 1, a statement of
the second law of thermodynamics for it.
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